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During the past three decades, a large number of countries have introduced reforms to decentralize public 
decision making. Such reforms have proved controversial.  Critics of these reforms argue that 
decentralized provision of infrastructure enhances vulnerability to corruption.  Proponents of these 
reforms counter that corruption arises from lack of people empowerment and decentralization by bringing 
decision making closer to people shines sunlight on government operations and empowers people to hold 
government to account and thereby offers potential for combating corruption in the long run. They further 
state that decentralized provision of infrastructure holds a great promise in upgrading infrastructure to 
underserviced especially rural areas with local self-government. In theory such decentralization is also 
expected to improve integrity of such operations especially in the event of local financing.  These debates, 
nevertheless, remain unsettled as empirical evidence on the impact of decentralization on infrastructure 
provision is scant or non-existent.  Empirical work is hampered by a lack of reliable data on the incidence 
of corruption. This paper presents conceptual underpinnings of the impact of decentralized provision of 
infrastructure on the incidence of corruption and synthesizes scant available empirical evidence to make a 
case for further empirical research to document the real world experiences to update our current state of 
knowledge on this subject. Much work lies ahead to limit our wide zone of ignorance in this area.           
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1. Introduction 
During the past two decades a silent revolution has swept the globe and a large number of industrial 
and developing countries have pursued decentralization reforms that attempt to move public decision 
making closer to people. The reform agenda has been pursued through varying combinations of 
political. administrative and fiscal decentralization initiatives that aim to shift some traditional central 
government functions to intermediate or lower orders of government. These reforms have proven to be 
controversial. This is because decentralization is perceived as a solution to some problems such as a 
dysfunctional public sector with lack of voice and exit as well as a source of new problems such as 
capture by local elite, aggravation of macroeconomic management due to a lack of fiscal discipline, race 
to the bottom and potentially greater barriers to common economic and social union through beggar-
thy-neighbor policies. The impact of decentralization on corruption (defined as the abuse of public office 
for private gain or exercise of official powers against public interest) is an area of growing interest 
inviting much controversy and debate. While this debate has largely centered on the overall impact of 
decentralization, the focus of current paper is to examine various arguments in this debate in the 
specific case of decentralized provision of infrastructure – a yet largely unexplored area of research. 
What is special about decentralized provision of infrastructure? 
Infrastructure projects are typically lumpy, have long gestational periods and are long lived. This implies 
that a local government must have assured financing of capital and maintenance costs and a plan for 
recovering capital costs and recurring costs over the life of the project. Infrastructure projects are 
typically costly and since in most countries local governments have constrained tax autonomy and even 
more constrained access to capital market finance, higher level financing and assistance for capital 
market access assumes critical importance for initiation of projects. Even if local governments may enjoy 
significant tax autonomy, poorer local jurisdictions would not have the revenue capacity to finance 
infrastructure provision from own revenue surpluses and would have typically no access to capital 
market finance due to a lack of credit worthiness even in the absence of prohibitions usually practiced 
against local bond finance. Higher level capital grant financing without local matching funds create 
incentives for softer budget constraints as local governments do not have to justify these expenses to 
electorate to have buy in for additional taxation. Infrastructure projects may entail inter-jurisdictional 
externalities as the optimal size to reap economies of scale may  be larger than required by one 
jurisdiction such as water purification and waste disposal plants or in the absence of user fees free 
ridership may be possible by residents of other jurisdictions such as for roads, bridges, mass transit and 




sports and recreation centers and libraries.  Therefore inter-municipal partnerships for cost sharing or 
higher level transfers to compensate for benefit spill-outs may be required.    
Why it is important to examine the implications of decentralized provision of infrastructure for the 
incidence of corruption? 
Decentralized provision of infrastructure is advocated for better matching of infrastructure services with 
local preferences and needs and for enhancing efficiency and equity of public provision. But if 
decentralized provision is seen to lead to a higher incidence of corruption especially with higher order 
grant financing then these advantages may be undermined. Corrupt practices in infrastructure affect the 
whole project investment and operations cycle and result in projects with roads and bridges to nowhere 
and creation of white elephants while a median voter is denied access to basic services such as clean 
water and sanitation. Potential of such corrupt practices is enhanced when these projects are mostly 
financed by higher order governments which is often a necessity with decentralized provision of 
infrastructure or external donors. Since infrastructure projects are typically lumpy and have long 
gestational periods, corrupt strategic behavior of current regimes can tie hands of future regimes to the 
priorities set by the initiating regime. The times of fiscal stress offer even greater opportunities for 
corruption as projects must be approved, financed and implemented on an accelerated schedule. In 
view of the potential negative impact of corruption on good governance, it is important to analyze the 
implications of decentralized provision of infrastructure for good government both in theory and in 
practice with a view to examining options for limiting opportunities for corruption while enhancing 
possibilities of detection and punishment. This paper takes an important first step in this direction by 
providing a synthesis of conceptual and empirical literature on this subject and highlighting the limits of 
our knowledge in this area especially the void in the area of empirical underpinnings of lessons in 
combating corruption. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an introductory review of fundamental concepts 
and concerns relating to corruption, its many facets and its drivers. Section 3 highlights corruption 
concerns with decentralized infrastructure provision. Section 4 presents counter arguments and  
discusses the promise of decentralized provision of infrastructure for improved service delivery and 
reduced corruption. Section 5 synthesizes available evidence on the relationship between decentralized 
infrastructure provision and corruption. Section 6 draws overall tentative conclusions on the 
susceptibility of decentralized provision to corruption. Section 7 draws lessons for a strategy to combat 
corruption when infrastructure provision is decentralized. A final section provides concluding remarks. 
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2. Corruption and Its Drivers: Fundamental Concepts and Concerns 
 
Corruption is defined as exercise of official powers against public interest or the abuse of public office 
for private gains. Public sector corruption is a symptom of failed governance. Here, we define 
“governance” as the norms, traditions and institutions by which power and authority in a country is 
exercised—including the institutions of participation and accountability in governance and mechanisms 
of citizens’ voice and exit and norms and networks of civic engagement; the constitutional-legal 
framework and the nature of accountability relationships among citizens and governments; the process 
by which governments are selected, monitored, held accountable and renewed or replaced; and the 
legitimacy, credibility and efficacy of the institutions that govern political, economic, cultural and social 
interactions among citizens themselves and their governments.  
Concern about corruption — the abuse of public office for private gain — is as old as the history of 
government. In  the 4th Century BCE, Kautaliya who served as an advisor responded to the Indian King’s 
concerns about corruption by arguing that corruption is inevitable. He wrote that “Just as it is not 
possible to not to taste honey placed on the surface of the tongue, even so it is not possible for one 
dealing with the money of the king not to taste the money in however a small quantity”. He further 
advised the king that corruption would be difficult to detect. He stated “Just as fish moving under water 
cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed 
in the government work cannot be found out (while) taking money (for themselves).”      In 350 B.C.E., 
Aristotle suggested in The Politics that “. . . to protect the treasury from being defrauded, let all money 
be issued openly in front of the whole city, and let copies of the accounts be deposited in various 
wards.” 
In recent years, concerns about corruption have mounted in tandem with growing evidence of its 
detrimental impact on growth and development (see World Bank, 2004). Figures 1 and 2 highlight the 
negative consequences of corruption for schooling and access to affordable housing in Indonesia. As a 
result of this growing concern, there has been universal condemnation of corrupt practices, leading to 
the removal of some country leaders. Moreover, many governments and development agencies have 
devoted substantial resources and energies to fighting corruption in recent years. Even so, it is not yet 
clear that the incidence of corruption has declined perceptibly, especially in highly corrupt countries. 
The lack of significant progress can be attributed to the fact that many programs are simply folk 
remedies or “one size fits all” approaches and offer little chance of success. For programs to work, they 




must identify the type of corruption they are targeting and tackle the underlying, country-specific 
 
causes, or “drivers,” of dysfunctional governance. This calls for examination of structure of government 
among other factors. 
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The many forms of corruption in infrastructure 
Corruption is not manifested in one single form; indeed it typically takes at least four broad forms. 
Petty, administrative or bureaucratic corruption.  Many corrupt acts are isolated transactions 
by individual public officials who abuse their office, for example, by demanding bribes and kickbacks, 
diverting public funds, or awarding favors in return for personal considerations. Such acts are often 
referred to as petty corruption even though, in the aggregate, a substantial amount of public resources 
may be involved. For infrastructure provision, petty corruption is often observed for “ greasing the 
wheels” in public-private interface in proposals, registration, procurement and access to public services. 
Grand corruption.  The theft or misuse of vast amounts of public resources by state officials—
usually members of, or associated with, the political or administrative elite—constitutes grand 
corruption.  For infrastructure provision ,  grand corruption occurs in the selection process for public 
procurement and in procurement itself and in public-private partnerships and interface. In developing 
countries, foreign private sector participation is considered a major source of such corruption. 
State or regulatory capture and influence peddling.  Collusion by private actors with public 
officials or politicians for their mutual, private benefit is referred to as state capture. That is, the private 
sector “captures” the state legislative, executive, and judicial apparatus for its own purposes.  State 
capture coexists with the conventional (and opposite) view of corruption, in which public officials extort 
or otherwise exploit the private sector for private ends. This form of corruption is prevalent in both 
industrial and developing countries.  
Patronage/paternalism and being a “team player”.   Using official position to provide 
assistance to clients having the same geographic, ethnic and cultural origin so that they receive 
preferential treatment in their dealings with the public sector including public sector employment. Also 
providing the same assistance on a quid pro quo basis to colleagues belonging to an informal network of 
friends and allies.  Geographic, ethnic and culture based patronage is commonplace in developing 
countries and “team player” form of corruption is fact of everyday life in industrial countries.    
 It is also known that corruption is country-specific; thus, approaches that apply common policies 
and tools (that is, one-size-fits-all approaches) to countries in which acts of corruption and the quality of 
governance vary widely are likely to fail. One needs to understand the local circumstances that 




encourage or permit public and private actors to be corrupt. Finally, we know that if corruption is about 
governance and governance is about the exercise of state power, then efforts to combat corruption 
demand strong local leadership and ownership if they are to be successful and sustainable.  
Many facets of corruption in the provision of infrastructure 
An important distinguishing aspect of infrastructure corruption is that mostly it comes in the form of 
grand corruption which is commonplace in both industrial and developing countries. OECD estimates 
that in OECD countries bribe rate in procurement for construction projects ranges from 5 to 25% of 
contract value (Ehlermann-Cache, 2007). In developing countries guesstimates place these much higher. 
Industrial countries have largely been successful in eliminating petty corruption through higher wages 
which remains widespread and adversely affects billions of people in developing countries. Table 1 
highlights the incidence of corruption in infrastructure provision at various decision points in the 
legislative-executive-private sector interface in provision of public infrastructure.  
Table 1.  Many facets of corruption in the provision of infrastructure – decentralized or not 
Decision Point Incidence of corruption  Type of corruption 
AT APPRAISAL/PLANNING STAGE 
Legislative framework Lobbying legislators for pet 
projects, log rolling, political 
campaign financing, perks and 
privileges in exchange for 
legislative favors, preparation of 
draft legislation by lobbyists 
Grand corruption, State capture 
(universal phenomenon) 
Policy making  Policy framework to suit special 
interest groups and bribe payers 
Executive capture, grand 
corruption, most countries 
Regulation Zoning and Regulatory 
framework tailored to favor 
special interest groups. Extortion 
over licensing. 
Executive capture, grand 
corruption, most countries 
Planning and Budgeting  Rezoning and selection of 
projects based upon bribes 
Executive capture, grand 
corruption, most countries 
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received. 
AT PROJECT FINANCING STAGE   
External Financing Higher costs of externally 
financed projects, 
Donors favor PPPs especially 
with foreign participation. 
Kickbacks in return for favorable 
terms. 
Executive capture, grand 
corruption, most developing 
countries 
Bond Financing Higher costs for floating bonds Grand corruption, some 
developing countries 
Grant Financing Pork barrel grants as quid pro 
quo for political finance 
Grand corruption by financing 
pork projects such as “The 
Bridge to Nowhere in Alaska”, 
most countries 
Tax Financing Elite capture Grand corruption though tax 
expenditures and financing of 
projects preferred by elites 
AT IMPLEMENTATION STAGE   
Public-private partnerships Collusion among public 
managers and private providers 
to give favorable terms to 
private participants in return for 
a bribe commonly practiced in 
energy and road projects, re-
negotiation of contracts during 
and after execution 
Grand corruption, most 
countries 
Program and project  
management 
Ghost projects, ghost 
employees, phantom 
expenditures 
Mostly grand corruption, most 
developing countries 
Public procurement Kick backs, rigged bidding and 
tendering. Mechanisms: 
Mostly grand corruption, most  
countries 





consulting fees, false services, 
overpayment, payment to a 
front company, Swiss and 
Cayman Island bank accounts, 
collusion among competitors.  
Procurement cycle: registration, 
manipulating specifications, 
insider info, quality reduction, 
clearance from inspectors, 
expediting payments.  
Construction Use of low quality materials, 
theft of materials, false prices 
Mostly grand corruption, most 
developing countries 
AT OPERATIONS STAGE   
Operations and maintenance False reporting, ghost workers Mostly grand corruption, most 
developing countries 
User Charges Theft and free ridership Petty corruption, most 
developing countries 
Public access Delay or denial of access Petty corruption , most 
developing countries 
AT EX-POSTEVALUATION STAGE   
Evaluation Project financing  and selection 
of evaluators leads to lack of 
independence and biased 
evaluations 
Patronage, most countries 
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Table 2.  Vulnerability to corruption observed in decentralized or not provision of infrastructure in various 
sectors 
Water and Sanitation  Land acquisition, Selection of contractors, bid rigging, compromising 
quality, bribes for connections, meter tampering, conflict of interest with 
officials involved in private provision, collusion with companies offering 
bottled water or tanker provision. 
Roads Land acquisition at above market prices, rehabilitation, selection of 
contractors, false procurement and maintenance expenditures, 
certification of quality of construction 
Electricity  Public utilities: Land acquisition, rights of way, rehabilitation, equipment 
purchase and repair mark ups, patronage appointments, defective 
meters, meter tampering, theft of electricity by tapping distribution lines 
with side payments, connections delays, false billing, response to non-
payment of bills, false subsidy payments, public sector guarantees for 
assured demand for supply at above market rates  
Private utilities: Selection, regulatory regime, price hikes, regulators 
turning blind eye to capital deterioration 
Hospitals Ghost hospitals, bribes for admissions and drugs, false procurement and 
construction,  
Schools Ghost schools, bribes for admissions, ghost enrollments, false 
procurement and corruption   
Fitness and Recreation centers Padding up cost of construction and purchase of equipment 
Source: Author’s perspectives 
Vulnerability to corruption is significant regardless of centralization or decentralization of provision as 
described in Table 2. With decentralization, however, the probability of detection of corruption is 
significantly enhanced. 
 What drives corruption? 
Public sector corruption, as a symptom of failed governance, depends on multitude of factors such as 
the quality of public sector management, the nature of accountability relations between the 
government and citizens, the legal framework and the degree to which public sector processes are 
accompanied by transparency and dissemination of information. Efforts to address corruption that fail 




to adequately account for these underlying “drivers” are unlikely to generate profound and sustainable 
results. To understand these drivers, a conceptual and empirical perspective is needed to understand 
why corruption persists and what can be a useful antidote. At the conceptual level, a number of 
interesting ideas have been put forward.  These ideas can be broadly grouped together in three 
categories (a) Principal- agent or agency models; (b) new public management perspectives; and (c) neo-
institutional economics frameworks. 
Conceptual Perspectives on Drivers of Corruption 
Principal- Agent Models 
This is the most widely used modeling strategy.  A common thread in these models is that  the 
government is led by a benevolent dictator, the principal, who aims to motivate government officials 
(agents) to act with integrity in the use of public resources (see Becker, 1968,  Becker and Stigler, 1974, 
Banfield 1975, Rose Ackerman 1975, 1978, Klitgaard 1988, 1991, Becker 1983).   One such view, the so-
called crime and punishment model by Gary Becker (1968), states that self-interested public officials 
seek out or accept bribes so long as the expected gains from corruption exceed the expected costs 
(detection and punishment)  associated with corrupt acts. Thus, according to this view, corruption could 
be mitigated by (a) reducing the number of transactions over which public officials have discretion; (b) 
reducing the scope of gains from each transaction; (c) increasing the probability for detection; and (d) 
increasing the penalty for corrupt activities.  Moreover, since it is costly to increase detection, but not to 
increase penalties (at least assuming detection is accurate), the most efficient way to eliminate 
corruption is to impose very high penalties with a relatively low probability of detection.   Klitgaard 
(1988) restates this model to emphasize the unrestrained monopoly power and discretionary authority 
of government officials. According to him, corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus 
accountability. To curtail corruption under this framework, one has to have a rules-driven government 
with strong internal controls and with little discretion to public officials. This model gained wide 
acceptance in public policy circles and served as a foundation for empirical research and policy design to 
combat administrative, bureaucratic, or petty corruption.  Experience in highly corrupt countries, 
however, contradicts the effectiveness of such an approach as the rules enforcers themselves add extra 
burden of corruption and lack of discretion is also thwarted by collusive behavior of corruptors. In fact 
lack of discretion is often cited as a defense by corrupt officials who partake in corruption as part of a 
vertically well-knit network enjoying immunity from prosecution.     
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Another variant of principal-agent models integrates the role of legislators and elected officials in the 
analysis. In this variant, high level government officials −represented by legislators or elected public 
officials− institute or manipulate existing policy and legislation in favor of particular interest groups − 
representing private sector interests and entities or individual units of public bureaucracy competing for 
higher budgets− in exchange of rents or  side payments. In this framework, legislators weigh the 
personal monetary gains from corrupt practices and improved chances of re-election against the chance 
of being caught, punished and losing an election with a tarnished reputation.  Factors affecting this 
decision include campaign financing mechanisms, information access by voters, the ability of citizens to 
vote out corrupt legislators, the degree of political contestability, electoral systems, democratic 
institutions and traditions and institutions of accountability in governance. Examples of such analyses 
include: Rose-Ackerman (1978), Andvig & Moene (1990), Grossman & Helpman (1994), Flatters & 
Macleod (1995), Chand & Moene (1997), Van Rijckeghem & Weder, (1998), Acconcia D’Amato & 
Martina (2003). This conceptual framework is useful in analyzing political corruption or state capture.  
There is a fine line dividing theoretical models that focus on the effects of localization on corruption and 
those that analyze the decentralization of corruption within a multi-tier hierarchy from an “industrial 
organization of corruption” type of framework. In the latter group a distinction is made between “top-
down corruption” −where corrupt high levels buy lower levels by sharing a portion of gains− and 
“bottom-up corruption” −where low level officials share their own collected bribes with superior levels 
to avoid detection or punishment. The former phenomenon is more likely to exist in a federal system of 
governance where powers may be shared among various orders of government and the alternate is 
more likely to prevail under unitary or centralized forms of governance or dictatorial regimes.  The 
impact of governance on the corruption networks is an interesting yet unresearched topic. Tirole (1986) 
analyzed one aspect of this network by means of a three-tier principal-supervisor-agent model (see also 
Guriev 1999). This extension of a conventional principal-agent model assists in drawing inferences 
regarding the type of corrupt relations that could evolve under a three-tier unitary government 
structure. These inferences are highly sensitive to underlying assumptions regarding principal-agent 
relationships under a multi-tiered system of governance (four-tier hierarchies are modeled by Carillo 
2000, Bac & Bag 1998). In Guriev’s three-tier hierarchy model the mid level bureaucrat supervises the 
agent and reports to the principal. In comparing the characteristics of equilibria with top-bottom-and all 
level corruption Guriev concludes that top−level corruption “is not efficient, as it redistribute rents in 
favor of agents, and therefore makes it more attractive for potential entrants” (p.2) and thereby leading 
to higher total corruption.  




Shleifer and Vishny (1993) utilize conventional industrial organization theory model and conclude that 
decentralization is likely to increase corruption. In this model, government bureaucracies and agencies 
act as monopolists selling complimentary government-produced goods which are legally required for 
private sector activity. The main idea behind the model is that under centralized corruption 
bureaucracies act like a joint monopoly, whereas under decentralized corruption bureaucracies behave 
as independent monopolies. When bureaucracies act as independent monopolies, they ignore the 
effects of higher prices on the overall demand for a good and hence drive up the cumulative bribe 
burden.  
Waller, Verdier and Gardner (2002) define decentralized corruption as a system in which higher level 
officials collect a fixed amount of bribe income from each of the bureaucrats that take bribes, without 
mandating on the bribe size that the bureaucrats charge. In a centralized system, on the contrary, bribe 
size is determined by the higher level of government which collects them from bureaucrats and 
redistributes it among them after keeping a share. Waller et al. posit that decentralized corruption leads 
to  lower  levels of total corruption in the economy (lower spread), higher levels of bribe per 
entrepreneur (higher depth), and a smaller  formal sector vis-a-vis a centralized corruption equilibrium. 
Yet, these results vary widely for specific ‘regimes’ in the model −when given parameters satisfy key 
conditions− for instance, for high-enough wages and monitoring systems, centralized corruption may 
reduce total corruption and expand the formal economy.  
While previously discussed studies centered on the organizational structure of corruption, Ahlin (2001) 
differs by concentrating on the effects  of bureaucratic decentralization. Under the assumption of no 
interregional mobility, corruption increases with the degree of bureaucratic decentralization but is 
independent of the degree of regional decentralization, whereas for perfect interregional mobility 
corruption decreases with regional decentralization and is independent of bureaucratic decentralization. 
A key intuition of the model is that corrupt bureaucrats fail to internalize the costs of increases in bribe-
charges imposed on other bureaucrats.  Arikan (2004) uses a tax competition framework to examine 
localization-corruption links and finds that  higher degree of decentralization is expected to lead to 
lower levels of corruption.  Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000a) shed light upon the determinants of 
capture of the democratic process. Not surprisingly, they conclude that the extent of relative capture is 
ambiguous and context specific.  
In conclusion, no definitive conclusions can be drawn regarding corruption and the centralization-
decentralization nexus from the agency type conceptual models. These models simply reaffirm that the 
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incidence of corruption is context dependent and therefore cannot be uncovered by generalized 
models.  
New Public Management Frameworks 
The new public management (NPM) literature, on the other hand, points to a more fundamental 
discordance among the public sector mandate, its authorizing environment and the operational culture 
and capacity.  According to NPM, this discordance contributes to government acting like a runaway train 
and government officials indulging in rent-seeking behaviors with little opportunity for citizens to 
constrain government behavior. This viewpoint calls for fundamental civil service and political reforms 
to create a government under contract and accountable for results. Public officials will no longer have 
permanent rotating appointments but instead they could keep their jobs as long as they fulfilled their 
contractual obligations (see Shah, 1999, 2005).   
 
The new public management (NPM) paradigms have clear implications for the study of localization and 
corruption as it argues for contractual arrangements in provision of public services. Such a contractual 
framework may encourage competitive service delivery through outsourcing, purchaser-provider split 
under a decentralized structure of governance. The NPM goals are harmonious with decentralization as 
greater accountability for results reinforces government accountability to citizens through voice and exit 
mechanisms. Conceptually, therefore, the NPM is expected to reduce opportunities for corruption (see 
Shah 1999, 2005). Andrews and Shah (2005) integrate these two ideas in a common framework of 
citizen-centered governance. They argue that citizen empowerment holds the key to enhanced 
accountability and reduced opportunities for corruption.  
 
Others disagree with such conclusions and argue that the NPM could lead to higher corruption as 
opposed to greater accountability.  This may happen because the tendering for service delivery and 
separation of purchasers from providers may lead to increased rent seeking behavior and enhanced 
possibilities for corruption (Batley 1999, Von Maravic, 2003). Further some argue that decentralized 
management leads to weaker vertical supervision from higher levels and the inadequacy of mechanisms 
to exert controls over decentralized agencies (Scharpf, 1997). This loss in vertical accountability is seen 
as a source of enhanced opportunities for corruption. Of course, this viewpoint simply neglects potential 
gains from higher horizontal accountability.  




Neo-Institutional Economics (NIE) Frameworks 
Finally, Shah (2006) has utilized the transactions costs approach of the neo-institutional economics (NIE) 
to present a newer perspective on the causes and cures of corruption. Shah argues that corruption 
results from opportunistic behavior of public officials (agents)  given that citizens (as governors and 
principals) are either not empowered or face high transaction costs to hold public officials accountable 
for their corrupt acts.  The principals have bounded rationality – they act rationally based upon the 
incomplete information they have. In order to have a more informed perspective on public sector 
operations, they face high transaction costs in acquiring and processing the information. On the other 
hand, agents (public officials) are better informed. This asymmetry of information allows agents to 
indulge in opportunistic behavior which goes unchecked due to high transactions costs faced by the 
principals and a lack of or inadequacy of countervailing institutions to enforce accountable governance. 
Thus corrupt countries have inadequate mechanisms for contract enforcement, weak judicial systems 
and inadequate provision for public safety. This raises the transactions costs in the economy further 
raising the cost of private capital as well as the cost of public service provision. The problem is further 
compounded by path dependency (i.e. a major break with the past is difficult to achieve as any major 
reforms are likely to be blocked by influential interest groups), cultural and historical factors and mental 
models where those who are victimized by corruption feel that attempts to deal with corruption will 
lead to further victimization, with little hope of corrupt actors being brought to justice. These 
considerations lead principals to the conclusion that any attempt on their part to constrain corrupt 
behaviors will invite strong retaliation from powerful interests. Therefore, citizen empowerment (e.g. 
through decentralization, citizens’ charter, bill of rights, elections and other forms of civic engagement) 
assumes critical importance in combating corruption because it may have a significant impact on the 
incentives faced by public officials to be responsive to public interest. 
3. The Perils of Decentralized Provision of Infrastructure in Breeding 
Corruption 
A number of arguments have been advanced to support the notion that corruption increases with 
localization. A few of these are summarized below. 
 
a) Personalism. Vito Tanzi (1995) argued that localization brings officials in close contact with 
citizens. This promotes personalism and reduces professionalism and arms length relationships. 
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Personalism in his view breeds corruption as officials pay greater attention to individual citizen needs 
and disregard public interest. Further, a higher degree of discretion at the local level and long tenure of 
local officials make it easier to establish unethical relationships (Prud’homme 1995). 
 
b) Weak monitoring and vertical controls. Impediments to corrupt practices also decrease as 
local politicians and bureaucrats collude to advance narrow self-interests while the effectiveness of 
auditing agencies and monitoring from the central level wanes (Prud’homme 1995). Localization may 
increase the motivation for corruption among public officials by creating an impression that they are 
subject to lower monitoring, control and supervision. 
 
c) Fiscal decentralization and overgrazing.  Treisman argues that decentralized federal systems 
tend to have higher corruption ratings due to (a) their larger size; (b) more likely to have separate police 
forces at both central and sub-national levels (which increases corruption due to overgrazing) and their 
greater propensity to have a regionally elected upper house of parliament with veto power (which also 
may increase corruption as regional governments may buy off these veto-players or have greater 
leverage to protect their ill-gotten gains). Using cross country regression analysis Treisman (1999, 2000, 
2002) presents empirical evidence that support the existence of this negative relationship. Treisman’s 
empirical results, however, are sensitive to the inclusion of other variables in the equation and may have 
omitted variables bias in view of a lack of underlying framework for corruption.  
A recent study by Fan, Lin and Treisman (2007) provides a more nuanced view of the impact of fiscal 
decentralization. Combining cross-sectional secondary data for 80 countries with a survey of 9000 
business owners, it finds that “in countries with large number of government or administrative tiers and 
(given local revenues) a larger number of local public employees, reported bribery was more frequent. 
When local or central governments received a larger share of GDP in revenue, bribery was less frequent” 
(p.1). These results suggest that while decentralization in general opens up possibilities for rent seeking 
by a larger number of individuals, tax decentralization limits such opportunities by bringing greater 
citizen oversight of local government operations.   
 
 d) Political decentralization and lack of discipline. Political decentralization is seen as a 
cascading system of bribes by Shleifer and Vishny (1993). They note that “to invest in a Russian 
company, a foreigner must bribe  every agency involved in foreign investment including the foreign 
investment office, the relevant industrial ministry, the finance ministry, the executive branch of the local 




government, the legislative branch, the central bank, the state property bureau, and so on.” (p. 615). In 
the same vain, Bardhan (1997) and  Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) [B&S] have argued that political 
centralization leads to lower levels of corruption. B&S sustain that political decentralization is seen as a 
source of corruption in Russia but not China. This conclusion emerges from the contrasting role of local 
governments in their relations with local enterprises observed in China and Russia. In China, local 
governments have provided a supporting role whereas in Russia, local governments have stymied the 
growth of new firms through taxation, regulation and corruption. The authors note that behavior of 
Russian local governments can be explained by (a) state capture by old firms, leading local governments 
to protect them from competition and (b) rent seeking behavior of local officials discouraging new firms 
to enter. The authors attribute this contrasting experience to presence of political decentralization in 
Russia and its absence in China. They argue that political centralization in China contributes to party 
discipline which in turn reduces the risk of local capture and corruption. However, B&S analysis does not 
pay sufficient attention to local-enterprise relations in the two countries. Local enterprises in China are 
owned and run by local governments and even deliver local services such as education, health and 
transportation in addition to their economic functions.  Thus local enterprises are part and parcel of the 
local government. In Russia, on the other hand, a mixed pattern of these relationships has begun to 
emerge. Therefore, the contrasting experience of the local governments may better be explained by 
agency problems rather than by political decentralization. In fact the weakening of party discipline 
through the emergence of powerful local leaders may be contributing to growth of local industry as the 
strong arm of central planning is held at bay by these leaders.  
e) Interest group capture. Opportunities for corruption increase due to a greater influence of 
interest groups at the local level (Prud’homme 1995). In this regard, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000a) 
argue that the probability of capture by local interest groups  could be greater at the local level if, for 
example, interest group cohesiveness (fraction of the richest class that contribute to lobby) is higher, or 
the proportion of informed voters is lower at the local level.  Lower levels of political awareness at the 
local level and less coverage of local elections by media may also impair local democracy and lead to 
higher capture. The notion of capture at the local levels due to weaknesses of the democratic system 
has also been raised by Shah (1998).  Concerns about risks of local capture are also expressed in a recent 
World Bank Study (World Bank, 2004). The study argues that decentralization may increase 
opportunities for corruption in some developing countries where interference in public administration is 
the norm, merit culture and management systems in the civil service are weak and institutions of 
participation and accountability are ineffective. The issue is significant, for example, in Pakistan and 
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Philippines and also relevant to Guatemala and Tanzania where more limited decentralization has been 
carried out. Pakistan has recently carried out a strong program of devolution to the provinces (Shah, 
2012). Given systemic politicization of public services in Pakistan, decentralization to the provinces may 
intensify rather than reduce pressures for political/bureaucratic collusion, although this may be further 
mitigated by further administrative decentralization, giving elected local officials the power to, hire, fire 
and set terms of employment of civil servants in their jurisdiction. Note that administration 
decentralization in areas under feudal influence is likely to exacerbate the corruption concerns. Identical 
concerns are pertinent in Philippines, where legislation in 1991 devolved to regions and localities 
powers to provide services and raise revenues. In Philippines, there is a long tradition of elected local 
public offices rotating among family members. The World Bank study is concerned with the effect of 
decentralization on corruption when there is a local capture by political and bureaucratic elites. There is 
little disagreement in the literature that in such a situation, localization without fundamental electoral 
and land reforms, is likely to increase corruption.  On the contrary, the perception of localization as a 
breeding ground for corruption in the presence of democratic participation and accountability, is neither 
grounded in theory nor in evidence.   
f) Lack of competition fosters collusive practices. It has been argued that in environments with 
weak or less developed private sector, as found in many developing countries, lack of competition at the 
local level fosters corruption in public-private sector interface as third party oversight is missing in such 
an environment. A national database on benchmarking could limit such opportunities for corruption as 
local residents would be better informed about costs of comparable operations in other jurisdictions.  
Table 3 attempts to capture the impact of the multitude of negative influences of 
decentralization on the incidence of corruption at various decision points. These negative influences 
dominate in the absence of representative democracy and competitive market pressures typically found 
in rural feudal dominated local governments. They are typically found also in urban areas when a few 
dominant developers build special patronage relatoionships with local council members.  
 
  




Table 3.  Perils of decentralized provision of infrastructure at various decision points   
Decision Point Impact of decentralization on 
the incidence of corruption  
Impact by type of corruption 
AT APPRAISAL/PLANNING STAGE 
Legislative framework In rural areas where feudal or 
industrial elites may dominate 
local councils local government 
may serve the interests of elite 
to the neglect of its services to 
rural residents at large.  
Enhanced opportunities for 
grand corruption through state 
capture  
Policy making  Rural councils dominated by 
elites can impose policy 
framework to suit special 
interest groups and bribe payers 
Enhanced executive capture, 
grand corruption 
Regulation Greater possibility of having 
zoning to favor developer 
interests in exchange for political 
finance and bribes and 
regulatory framework tailored to 
favor special interest groups  
Enhanced executive capture, 
grand corruption 
Planning and Budgeting  Greater opportunities for 
rezoning and selection of 
projects based upon bribes and 
other benefits received. 
Enhanced executive capture, 
grand corruption 
AT PROJECT FINANCING STAGE   
External Financing Higher costs of externally 
financed projects, 
Donors favor PPPs especially 
with foreign participation. 
Kickbacks in return for favorable 
terms. 
Enhanced executive capture, 
grand corruption, most 
developing countries 
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Bond Financing No impact Negligible incidence of 
corruption 
Grant Financing Some pork barrel grants as quid 
pro quo for political finance still 
possible 
Some grand corruption by 
financing pork projects as bridge 
to nowhere in Alaska, most 
countries 
Tax Financing Little impact   
AT IMPLEMENTATION STAGE   
Public-private partnerships Collusion among public 
managers and private providers 
to give favorable terms to 
private participants in return for 
a bribe commonly practiced in 
energy and road projects, re-
negotiation of contracts during 
and after execution 
Grand corruption persists when 
transparency and competitive 
pressures are lacking 
Program and project  
management 
 Little perverse impact   
Public procurement Kick backs, rigged bidding and 
tendering still possible. 
Mechanisms: intermediary 
collusion, consulting fees, false 
services, overpayment, payment 
to a front company,   collusion 
among competitors.  
Procurement cycle: registration, 
manipulating specifications, 
insider info, quality reduction, 
clearance from inspectors, 
expediting payments.  
Grand corruption could be 
enhanced in the short run 
Construction Use of low quality materials, Mostly grand corruption, most 




theft of materials, false prices developing countries 
   
AT OPERATION STAGE   
Operations and maintenance False reporting still possible   Mostly grand corruption, most 
developing countries 
User Charges Theft and free ridership feasible Petty corruption could go up in 
the short run 
Public access Isolated incidences of delays or 
denial of access still possible 
Some petty corruption 
AT EX-POST EVALUATION STAGE   
Evaluation Biased favorable evaluation Patronage – most countries 
Source: Author’s perspectives 
Table 4 attempts to draw the implications of these negative influences for corruption in 
individual sectors. Patron-client relationships immune from public scrutiny are the major sources of 
various forms of corruption.   
Table 4.  Enhanced Vulnerability to corruption introduced by decentralized provision of infrastructure in 
various sectors 
Water and Sanitation  Favoritism in  selection of contractors, bid rigging, bribes for connections, 
meter tampering, conflict of interest with officials involved in private 
provision, collusion with companies offering bottled water or tanker 
provision. 
Roads, bridges and mass transit Favoritism in selection of contractors, some false procurement and 
maintenance expenditures, and false certification of quality of 
construction still possible  
Electricity  Public utilities: equipment purchase and repair mark ups, patronage 
appointments, defective meters, meter tampering, theft of electricity by 
tapping distribution lines with side payments, connections delays, false 
billing, response to non-payment of bills, false subsidy payments, public 
sector guarantees for assured demand for supply at above market rates  
Private utilities: Selection, regulatory regime, price hikes, regulators 
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turning blind eye to capital deterioration 
Hospitals false procurement and padding up of construction costs, bribes for 
admissions and drugs 
Schools  false procurement and padding up of construction costs, false 
enrollments, bribes for admissions   
Fitness, sports and recreation 
centers 
Padding up cost of construction and purchase of equipment 
Source: Author’s perspectives 
4. The Promise of Decentralized Provision of Infrastructure in Limiting 
Opportunities for Corruption      
Decentralization’s ability to curtail corruption opportunities has been commonly based on the potential 
for greater accountability when the decision making is closer to the people. This line of thought is 
supported from the following perspectives:  
a) Competition among local governments for mobile factors of production re-inforces the 
accountability culture. Such enhanced accountability has the potential to reduce corruption (Weingast, 
1995, Arikan 2000).  
b) Exit and voice mechanisms at the local level. There is a general agreement in the literature 
that localization can open up greater opportunities for voice and choice thereby making the public 
sector more responsive and accountable to citizens-voters. Furthermore, due to regional heterogeneity 
of political preferences localization may reduce the range of potential capture by a unique nationally 
dominant party.  
c)  Higher levels of information. Seabright (1996) argues that accountability is always better at 
the local level, since local citizens who are better informed about government performance can vote 
these governments out of office. Under centralization people vote for parties or candidates partly on the 
basis of performance in other regions and partly on issues of national interest. As a result accountability 
is defused and potential for corruption increases. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000b) also argue that 
decentralization in developing countries promotes cost-effectiveness and reduces corruption, owing to 
the superior access of local governments to information on local costs and needs.  




d) Lower expected gains from corruption but greater probability of detection and punishment. 
Administrative decentralization causes a loss in control to higher levels, thus curbing their incentives to 
monitor and detect corrupt activities. However, it also lowers the expected gains from corruption as, 
following decentralization, the number of individuals who are in charge of a single decision is reduced. It 
is then more likely that corrupt agents are called to bear the consequences of their actions. This line of 
thought complements those put forward by Carbonara (1999); who concludes that decentralization 
although creating agency problems inside an organization can help in controlling corruption; and 
Wildasin (1995), who argues that local officials with limited powers have little scope to engage in grand 
corruption.   
e) Reduced corruption due to reduction in information asymmetry between politicians and 
bureaucrats. Ahlin (2000) has argued that deconcentration has the potential to increase corruption, 
whereas political decentralization has the potential to contain it due to interjurisdictional competition. 
This may result from a reduction in the information asymmetry between bureaucrats and the politicians 
that appoint them vis a vis a politically centralized systems.  Crook and Manor (2000) examined the 
process of political decentralization in India (Karnatka state), Bangladesh, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana and 
find that such decentralization leads to enhanced transparency. With this enhanced transparency, 
ordinary citizen become better aware of government’s successes and failures and they may perceive the 
government institutions more corrupt than the perception they had before. They observed that in 
Karnatka, India, political decentralization substantially reduced the amount of public funds diverted by 
powerful individuals. However, since citizens were not aware of these diversions, they concluded that 
corruption had increased.  Crook and Manor based upon evidence from Karnatka conclude that political 
decentralization reduces grand theft but increases petty corruption in the short run but in the long run 
both may go down. Olowu (1993) also finds political centralization as a root cause of endemic corruption 
in Africa. Fiszbein (1997) based upon a review of political decentralization in Colombia concludes that 
competition for political office opened the door for responsible and innovative leadership that in turn 
became the driving force behind capacity building, improved service delivery and reduced corruption at 
the local level.    
f) Improved local accountability with administrative decentralization reduces corruption. A few 
studies show that administrative decentralization reduces corruption. Wade (1997) finds that over-
centralized top down management accompanied by weak communication and monitoring systems 
contributes to corruption and poor delivery performance for canal irrigation in India. Kuncoro (2000) 
finds that with administrative decentralization in Indonesia, firms relocated to areas with lower bribes.  
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g) Local fiscal autonomy improves economic management and reduces corruption. Huther and 
Shah (1998) using international cross-section and time series data find that fiscal decentralization is 
associated with enhanced quality of governance as measured by citizen participation, political and 
bureaucratic accountability, social justice, improved economic management and reduced corruption. 
Arikan (2004) reconfirms the same result.  De Mello and Barenstein (2001) based upon cross-country 
data conclude that tax decentralization is positively associated with improved quality of governance.  
Fisman and Gatti (2002) find a negative relation between fiscal decentralization and corruption.  Gurgur 
and Shah (2002) is the only study providing a comprehensive theoretical and empirical framework on 
the root causes of corruption. They identify major drivers of corruption in order to isolate the effect of 
decentralization.  In a sample of industrial and non-industrial countries, lack of service orientation in the 
public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal 
bureaucratic controls and centralized decision making are identified as the major causes of corruption. 
For a non-industrial countries sample, drivers for corruption are lack of service orientation in the public 
sector, weak democratic institutions and closed economy. Decentralization reduces corruption but has a 
greater negative impact on corruption in unitary countries than in federal countries. They conclude that 
decentralization is confirmed to support greater accountability in the public sector and reduced 
corruption. 
h) Lower transactions costs for citizens to hold the government to account.  Decentralization 
brings greater clarity in division of responsibilities and services that are delivered locally, citizens’ 
transactions costs to hold the government to account are significantly reduced as they have better 
information on service delivery performance and costs as well as redress opportunities and mechanisms.  
i) Greater Transparency. Local government operations are by their nature more transparent due 
to greater local knowledge. In the USA, this transparency is further enhanced by output based budgeting 
and reporting adopted by most local governments voluntarily to build citizens’ trust.  In such an 
environment collusive practices are well recognized by citizens thereby curtailing corrupt practices. 
Table 5 captures the combined impact of the confluence of factors mentioned above to limit 
opportunities for corruption while enhancing potential for detection and prosecution at various points 
in public decision making. The table shows that decentralization will have some positive influence on 
curtailing corruption at almost all decision points. However, decentralization offers some promising 
entry points for having a major impact on reducing corruption. First major entry point is public hearings 




on zoning.  This process offers residents an opportunity to learn reasons behind rezoning and interest 
groups involved.  The second and probably the most important entry point in curtailing corruption is the 
public procurement process. The transparency and integrity of this process will significantly curtail the 
incidence of corruption. The incidence of corruption also depends upon the nature and source of 
infrastructure finance available to local governments.  If financing is no concern as in oil rich countries, 
incidence of corruption may be higher as the local governments no longer have to seek approval of 
additional financing or justify such expenses to local electorate. The incidence of corruption is 
accentuated by having non-elected local governments as in the Middle East. Local governments that 
finance infrastructure projects from own sources are likely to have a greater integrity of the entire 
project cycle due to active involvement of electorate in ensuring that their tax dollars to put to best use.      
Thus  citizen activism and openness of the democratic processes plays a critical role in curtailing the 
impact of corruption.  
Table 5.  Potential of Decentralization in curtailing corruption at various decision points  
Decision Point Impact of Decentralization on 
the Incidence of corruption  
Impact by the type of corruption   
AT APPRAISAL/PLANNING STAGE 
Legislative framework In urban areas with greater 
citizens engagement, lobbying 
influences and perks and 
privileges in exchange for 
legislative favors are 
constrained.  
Opportunities for grand 
corruption are curtailed due to 
smaller projects and greater 
transparency.  State capture rare 
in urban areas. 
Policy making  Policy framework to suit special 
interest groups and bribe payers 
stunted due to adversarial 
citizen watch groups 
Executive capture and  grand 
corruption is reduced in most 
countries 
Regulation Extortion over licensing is 
eliminated. 
Executive capture and  grand 
corruption is reduced in most 
countries 
Planning and Budgeting  Competitive providers limit Executive capture, grand 
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rezoning and selection of 
projects based upon bribes 
received. 
corruption is reduced in most 
countries 
AT PROJECT FINANCING STAGE   
External Financing No positive impact Executive capture, grand 
corruption, most developing 
countries 
Bond Financing Little opportunity for corruption 
in bond financing as it is only 
done for major metropolitan 
areas with central oversight 
Incidence of corruption is 
minimal. 
Grant Financing Competitive inter-jurisdictional 
pressures typically result in 
transparent formula driven grant 
financing limiting funds for pork 
barrel grants as quid pro quo for 
political finance 
Grand corruption opportunities 
are constrained. 
Tax Financing Greater transparency in local tax 
policy and administration limits 
elite capture 
Grand corruption though tax 
expenditures and financing of 
projects preferred by elites is 
curtailed 
AT IMPLEMENTATION STAGE   
Public-private partnerships Little impact on public official 
and private managers collusive 
practices due to complex 
contractual relationship not 
easily understood by 
residents/voters. 
Little impact on opportunities for 
grand corruption in most 
countries 
Program and project  
management 
Greater transparency in 
decentralized provision largely 
eliminates potential for ghost 
Opportunities for grand 
corruption are greatly 
constrained. 




projects, ghost employees, 
phantom expenditures 
Public procurement Potential for kick backs, rigged 
bidding and tendering is greatly 
reduced.  
 
Opportunities for  grand 
corruption reduced in most  
countries 
Construction Benchmarking limits 
opportunities for padding costs. 
Grand corruption is curtailed. 
AT OPERATION STAGE   
Operations and maintenance False reporting, ghost workers 
constrained due to citizen 
feedback loops 
Opportunities for  grand 
corruption curtailed in most 
developing countries 
User Charges Little impact Little impact on petty corruption 
Public access Some positive  impact on delay 
or denial of access due to timely 
recourse and lower transactions 
costs for citizens to hold corrupt 
officials to account. 
Petty corruption reduced 
AT EX-POST EVALUATION STAGE   
Evaluation Independent evaluations and 
citizen-based monitoring and 
evaluation lead to fair 
evaluations.   
Patronage curtailed 
Source: Author’s perspectives 
Table 6 embodies the influence of decentralized institutions on combating corruption to develop 
an aggregate view of these influences at the sector level.  The table highlights potential positive 
influences of government closeness to the people on the integrity of provision of infrastructure at the 
local level. The table shows that while decentralization limits opportunities for corruption especially 
grand corruption, overall positive impact may be less observable for  fitness, sports and recreation 
centers  due to the non-standard nature of these projects benchmarking of costs may be more difficult 
as compared to standard infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges.   
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Table 6     .  Promise of Decentralization in Reducing Vulnerability to corruption observed in provision of 
infrastructure in various sectors 
Water and Sanitation  Diminished potential for land acquisition at above market rate due to 
wider local knowledge of land values, lower potential for compromising 
quality due to improved citizen feedback loops. 
Roads, bridges and mass transit Diminished potential for land acquisition at above market prices, 
diminished opportunities for false procurement and maintenance 
expenditures, constrained opportunities for false certification of quality 
of construction 
Electricity  Public utilities: Diminished potential land acquisition at above market 
rates and acquiring the rights of way, and false subsidy payments and 
public sector guarantees for assured demand for supply at above market 
rates.  
Private utilities: Reduced potential for corruption in the regulatory 
regime due to greater citizen oversight 
Hospitals Eliminates opportunity for ghost hospitals  
Schools Eliminates opportunities for ghost schools   
Fitness, sports and Recreation 
centers 
Little impact on padding up costs 
Source: Author’s perspectives 
 
In all, a small yet growing body of theoretical and empirical literature confirms that localization offers 
significant potential in bringing greater accountability and responsiveness to the public sector at the 
local level and reducing the incidence of grand corruption. While most of this literature is focused on 
decentralized provision of all services yet their conclusion apply in equal force to infrastructure as 
infrastructure provision dominates local government expenditures.    




5. The Evidence 
 
While a growing number of empirical studies have examined the relationship between 
decentralization and corruption, only a handful of these studies have examined the specific impact of 
decentralized provision of infrastructure. Santos (1968) discovered that sectoral allocation of spending 
improved with participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Isham and Kahkonen (1999) observed 
improvements in water services in Central Java, Indonesia with local community management. A World 
Bank study (2004) found improvement in a few  local government areas in decentralized provision of 
water and sanitation services.  A study of local government procurement in the Philippines revealed that 
(see Tapales, 2001, p.21): “contractors admit to paying mayors of the towns where they have projects, 
because , they say, the officials can delay the work by withholding necessary permits or harassing the 
workers. Municipal mayors get seven percent while the barangay (village) captain is given three percent. 
The heads of implementing agencies – usually the district, municipal or city engineer – get about 10     
percent.”  A study of canal irrigation in India attributed corruption to centralization of management 
(Wade, 1997).  
A World Bank study (World Development Report, 1994) compared results under centralized vs 
decentralized maintenance of roads and found that countries with decentralized maintenance had 
better roads. This finding indirectly implies that with centralized provision there were greater leakage of 
public funds through mismanagement, inefficiency, waste and corruption.  
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Figure 3. Countries with decentralized road maintenance have better roads 
Source: World Development Report, 1994, p.75 
Empirical work on the impact of decentralization on the incidence of corruption is seriously hampered 
by a lack of reliable data especially on the incidence of corruption.  The two most widely used sources 
are the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Indexes (CPIs) and Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGIs) published by the World Bank. Both measures are seriously flawed and indefensible as 
they make false comparisons across countries for any year and over time and for tracking any country 
overtime1. Underlying data bases they use simply do not permit such rankings and comparisons as 
different sources of survey data and questions with weights that vary overtime for each country and 
across countries are used (see Arndt, 2008a,b and Ivanyna and Shah, 2011  for a critique and illustration 
                                                          
1 The editors of this volume take strong exception to the author’s view and state,” While the first statement is 
correct - we have a gap of data on governance at the sub- national level, the second statement would need to re-
considered since it seems to suggest that the authors of the indicators are suggesting to use the data to evaluate 
governance over time at the sub national level.  The authors of the WGI have over and over warned researchers 
and practitioners about the limit of their data, meaning of a cross country/cross-year comparison and the objective 
of their data: to simply highlight that there is a governance issue in a country.  The WGI also seem to be the only 
indicators that provide the margin of errors and the sources of the data.  The authors also emphasize that the WGI 
are not actionable and cannot help to design a policy reform.  They are simply a starting point to mobilize public 
opinion around this issue (as the CPI).” (May 13, 2013 e-mail to the author, p.3). See also Galtung (2006).  
 




of this point using data sources and weights used by both CPI and WGI indicators and Ivanyna and Shah, 
2011 for an illustration of an alternate methodology).  Professor Joel Slemrod, University of Michigan , 
has aptly remarked in another context  but his saying applies equally well here,  “ Whatever we have 
learned is false and whatever we know is half truth. We really do not know what we do know or do not 
know.” Moreover, these measures are simply not available at subnational levels. What is needed is a 
worldwide survey using uniform questionnaire and employing a stratified random sampling approach in 
each country to seek an aggregate view of local perceptions on the incidence of corruption.  Ivanyna and 
Shah (2011, 2012, 2013) take a first small step in this direction as well as developing subnational 
indicators. There is also need for rigorous case study work in this area. In recent years, the University of 
Gotenburg and the World Bank has taken small steps to  improve our knowledge on quality of 
governance at subnational levels.2  
 
6. Overall Impact of Decentralized Provision of Infrastructure on Corruption – 
by sector and by type of corruption: Some Tentative Conclusions 
Earlier section demonstrated that empirical work on the impact of decentralized provision of 
infrastructure is scant. A handful of studies available indicate overall positive influence of 
decentralization on the integrity of public infrastructure provision. Given the paucity of evidence, one 
cannot, however, reach any conclusive view on this issue. Conceptual literature on the subject, is 
however, vast and yet equally inconclusive.  While the dominant theme in this literature again is the 
positive influence of decentralization in curtailing corruption, yet it cannot serve as the basis for 
reaching any definitive conclusions. In fact there is some wisdom in not reaching any conclusive view as 
the incidence is case dependent. Much depends upon the history, culture, organization and public and 
private sector environment of each case study. Recognizing this important proviso, table 7 presents a 
stylized conjectural view of the overall impact of decentralized provision of infrastructure on the sector 
and type of corruption. Short run (SR) impact of decentralization of decentralization on petty corruption 
is conjectured to be positive in curtailing corruption for water and sanitation, transportation and 
electricity and sports and recreation centers but petty bribes for hospital and school admissions and 
drugs may continue and could be perceived to have increased in view of greater access to information 
and transparency with decentralization. In the long run, greater local accountability and oversight kicks 
in to reduce petty corruption in all sectors. Decentralization is also expected to reduce grant corruption 
in all sectors except sports and recreation centers in the short run. For sports and recreation centers in 
the short run, it may be difficult to hold local government to account due to a lack of adequate 
information in view of the non-standard nature of these infrastructures but in the long run grand 
corruption is expected to be reduced in all sectors due to better information and greater local 
accountability. State or regulatory captures or clientelism where it persists may not be overcome by 
                                                          
2
  See University of Goteburg ,http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/ and the 2012 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) focus on quality of governance at the sub national level. The BEEPS is a joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank Group. http://beeps.prognoz.com/beeps/Home.ashx and World Bank Governance 
Diagnostic Surveys (http://go.worldbank.org/Q7ZUV9AG) 
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decentralization either in the short run or in the long run as these phenomenon are related to the 
nature of political and cultural institutions and may be hard to overcome without fundamental political 
finance and land reforms. And the latter reforms may be blocked by powerful local elites.      
 
Table 7. Overall Impact of Decentralization on Curtailing Corruption in Infrastructure in developing 
countries 
Sector  Type of Corruption  
 Petty  Grand State or regulatory 
capture 
Clientelism 
 SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
Water and 
sanitation 
+ + + + - - - - 
Roads, bridges, 
mass transit 
+ + + + - - - - 
Electricity - Public + + + + - - - - 
Electricity- Private + + + + - - - - 
Hospitals - + + + -- - - - 
Schools - + + + - - - - 
Fitness, sports and 
recreation centers 
+ + - + - - - - 
OVERALL ? + + + - - - - 
Source: Author’s perspectives 
 
7. Ensuring Integrity of Decentralized Provision of Public Infrastructure 
: The Way Forward 
 
The decentralized provision of infrastructure holds the promise of curtailing corruption provided there is 
no elite capture, strong institutions of accountability in governance, results based governance culture 
and an educated and empowered citizenry. These ideal conditions are absent to varying degrees in most 
countries. In view of this, one has to tailor institutional design for integrity to individual country and 
locality conditions. In the following, we provide a stylized view of such policies based on the initial state 
of public governance in the country.  
As a starting point, one has to consider unbundling infrastructure services for market competition. By 
isolating first the natural monopoly segments of the sector, one can examine range of market 
alternatives for unbundling rest of infrastructure provision.  This includes regulatory framework that 
encourages: (a) competition for substitutes; (b) competition for infrastructure markets; (c) competition 
for the right to supply the entire market through leases and concessions; (d) privatization of some 




monopolies to reap efficiency gains; and (e) having national and regional data bases to provide 
benchmark on similar operations.   
Beyond that one has to apply a “corruption opportunity test”  (Khan, 2008) to each case of government 
intervention by asking,  
1. Is the culture of government organization and environment conducive to corruption?   
2. What is the probability that applicable laws, rules, regulations, procedures, instructions or 
practices, could be misused or bypassed by corrupt intentions? 
3. Are there controls in place that would forestall a corrupt person from indulging in corruption by 
abuse of authority or misuse of discretion or misinterpretation or disregard of rules? 
Answers to above questions will help in developing location specific safeguards in ensuring integrity of 
public financing  or provision of infrastructure. In dealing with various forms of corruption in 
infrastructure provision, policy and institutional response will vary according to local circumstances. 
Table 8 provides a stylized view of such responses in two polar cases of countries and localities with 
good and poor governance. The table stresses the importance of more fundamental policy and 
institutional reforms in the case of poor governance and mostly direct focus on detection and 
punishment of corruption in case of good governance.  
Table 9 presents options for improving governance of individual sectors to ensure incorruptible 
governance. The table emphasizes creating an incentive cum accountability regime to ensure that all 
stakeholders  advance public interest. This is best done by introducing a bottom-line for government 
where no bottom-line exists,  introducing competition to improve voice and exit options for citizens and 
strengthening citizens’ oversight of all providers and sunshine provisions to ensure that government and 
private providers are subjected to continuous scrutiny.  These practices are expected to improve 
management of infrastructure provisions and its responsiveness to citizens’ needs and preferences as 
well accountability of providers to residents. Such incentives and accountability regime is expected to 
improve efficiency, equity and integrity of public provision of infrastructure.   
Having a broader local public finance management framework that is focused on incorruptible, 
responsible and accountable governance at the local level can also help in safeguarding against 
malfeasance and corruption. This framework emphasizes, fiscal transparency, a framework for fiscal 
discipline, output-based central-local financing, output based budgeting and activity based costing, 
people empowerment, competitive financing and provision with voice and exit options, contractual 
rather than life-long local service appointments, output based performance contracts  and external 
audits (see Shah and Shah, 2006 for details on the institutional framework for FAIR ( fair, accountable, 
incorruptible and responsive) governance). 
In short the success of decentralized provision of infrastructure with integrity strongly rests on having an 
open local government with citizen based accountability framework that is reinforced by results based 
higher level financing.  Once there is at least a fair level of institutional framework that supports such 
local governance, then there are some promising entry points such as open process of zoning or a 
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framework for integrity in procurement and results based management that have the significant 
potential to curtail corruption at the local level.    
     
Table 8. Ensuring Integrity of Decentralized Provision of Public Infrastructure: 
Options 
Type of corruption Existing state of governance in national and local jurisdictions 
 Good Poor 
Legislative Capture  Political finance reforms Establish rule of law, strengthen 
institutions of accountability in 
governance, land reforms, citizen 
empowerment, media independence 
Executive capture Separation of legislative and executive 
powers, citizen empowerment 
Transparency in governance, anti-
monopoly and pro-competition legal 
framework, results based accountability  
Grand corruption at various decision 
points 
Transparency requirements. Investigations 
and Prosecution  
Managing for results human resource 
framework. Transparency rules. Police, 
justice reforms. Output based budgeting 
and activity based accounting, 
benchmarking, Results based and 
competitive financing of all providers. Text 
messaging to a complaints bureau, 
prosecution, punitive sanctions on 
conviction. 
Grand corruption in public procurement Investigations and Prosecution  PFM reforms, corruption opportunity test 
framework for procurement, transparency, 
competitive open bidding, independent 
tender evaluation, simplification of tender 
document, smaller size contracts, 
benchmarking requirements, severe 
sanctions for non-compliance 
Grand corruption in public-private 
partnerships 
Transparency provisions for contracts. 
Managerial accountability for safeguarding 
public interest. Prohibition on 
renegotiating contracts during or post 
implementation. Investigations and 
Prosecution. 
Facilitating private sector development and 
enhancement of competition to provide 
public services. Transparent and open 
contracts subject to legislative ratification, 
public scrutiny and examination, 
benchmarking requirements, 
Investigations and Prosecution 
Administrative corruption and theft in 
public distribution 
Investigations and Prosecution  Rights based approach to public services. 
Greater voice and exit options.     
Transparency, open management 
information system, mopping operations 
Conflict of interest by employees  Oversight and sanctions by peers Citizen complaints bureaus, peer based 
sanctions. 
Source: Author’s perspectives 




    
Table 9. Ensuring Integrity of Decentralized Provision of Public Infrastructure: 
Options for Sectoral Reforms in developing countries 
Sector  Policies for incorruptible management 
    
Water and Sanitation   Commercialized public authority, concessions and lease, local community, user group 
oversight, transparency requirements  
Roads, bridges and mass transit  Commercialized public authority, concession or lease with tolls, rural roads by 
community self-help or user groups, user group oversight, transparency of financial and 
service delivery reports 
Electricity – Public Utilities  Commercialization of public utilities with 
explicit contractual mandates, and citizen 
oversight boards, transparency 
requirements 
  
 Electricity – private utilities  Regulatory oversight on capital and 
maintenance, price regulation, Citizens 
oversight board, transparency 
requirements  
  
Hospitals  Competitive financing of public and 
private hospitals  to foster competition 
Commercialization of public hospitals with 
autonomous citizen management and 
oversight boards, transparency 
requirements 
  
 Schools  Competitive financing of public and 
private schools to foster competition, 
Parents’ committees oversight on all 
aspects of school operations, transparency 
requirements 
  
Fitness, Sports and Recreation Centers   Citizens’ oversight boards, referenda 
provisions for approving new projects, 
transparency requirements 
  
Source: Author’s perspectives 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
During the past three decades, a large number of countries have introduced reforms to decentralize 
public decision making. Such reforms have  proved controversial.  Critics of these reforms argue that 
decentralized provision of infrastructure enhances vulnerability to corruption.  Proponents of these 
reforms counter that corruption arises from lack of people empowerment and decentralization by 
bringing decision making closer to people shines sunlight on government operations and empowers 
people to hold government to account and thereby offers potential for combating corruption in the long 
run. They further state that decentralized provision of infrastructure holds a great promise in upgrading 
infrastructure to underserviced especially rural areas with local self-government. In theory such 
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decentralization is also expected to improve integrity of such operations especially in the event of local 
financing.  These debates, nevertheless, remain unsettled as empirical evidence on the impact of 
decentralization on infrastructure provision is scant or non-existent.  Empirical work is hampered by a 
lack of reliable data on the incidence of corruption. This paper has presented conceptual underpinnings 
of the impact of decentralized provision of infrastructure on the incidence of corruption and synthesized 
scant available empirical evidence to make a case for further empirical research to document the real 
world experiences to update our current state of knowledge on this subject. Much work lies ahead to 
limit our wide zone of ignorance in this area.           
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